

# Legal Status at Migration and Migrant Networks

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## Abstract

This paper investigates whether – and how – migrant networks differentially impact authorized and unauthorized migration and advances prior work by clarifying mechanisms, testing social capital theory against competing explanations, and distinguishing among authorized/unauthorized entries and initial stays of varying legal statuses. The literature has largely ignored legal status at migration; the one exception analyzed a set of extremely restricted indicators. This paper applies discrete-time event history analysis to the longitudinal MAFE-Senegal data (2008) collected in Africa (Senegal) and Europe (France, Italy and Spain). Specifically, I employ a competing risks (multinomial logistic) model to distinguish between authorized and unauthorized 1<sup>st</sup>-time migration entry into Europe, as well as different legal status (authorized, unauthorized, visa overstay) in initial stay. Results indicate that strong tied networks actually *decrease* the likelihood of unauthorized entry. Longer-term migrant networks are especially important for authorized entry. In terms of legal status at initial stay, visa overstay is especially sensitive to migrant network ties and resources: current migrant networks are especially influential, as is the diversity of migrant social capital resources.

## 1. INTRODUCTION

Legal status is not a static concept. People move in and out of illegality for different reasons: individual work and residential trajectories (eg. Massey and Espinosa 1997), including visa overstays; family trajectories such as birthing an anchor baby (Castañeda 2008); asylum procedures (Carling 2007). Furthermore, legal status is a social construct: changing borders can “create” unauthorized migrants (Schrover *et al* 2008); policies at destination, including extraordinary regularizations, can change the idea of who is legal (Schrover *et al* 2008); and cultural norms affect who is considered illegal (Moors and DeRegt 2008). Historically throughout the world, there has always been a gap between governments’ desire (and talk) to control migration and its ability to do so (Schrover *et al* 2008:12-20). In fact, according to Schrover *et al* (2008: 19), countries have never welcomed poor migrants and, as labor market and welfare regulation increased, so have states’ controls on migration.

At the same time, migrant networks are a key link between origin and destination. On one hand, they play a key role in propagating migration flows far beyond their initial causes (Massey and García España 1987). At the individual level, migrant network influence varies with network composition and individual characteristics. Individuals are more likely to migrate if their parents, siblings and extended family already have (Massey 1990, Massey and Espinosa 1997, Espinosa and Massey 1999), even when competing explanations are accounted for (Palloni *et al* 2001, Liu 2011). Friendship networks also make migration more likely (Liu 2011). The impacts of migrant networks are gendered (Cerrutti and Massey 2001, Curran and Rivero-Fuentes 2003, Curran *et al* 2005, Kanaiaupuni 2000, Stecklov *et al* 2010, Toma and Vause 2011) and depend on the characteristics of resources offered by the network itself (Garip 2008, Liu 2011).

All in all, surprisingly little is known about whether (and how) the roles of migrant networks change depending on the legal statuses of migration. Theoretically, authorized and unauthorized migrations are related, but distinct processes with a series of distinguishable costs and requirements, but this has not been thoroughly developed. Nor has the existing empirical literature explored this satisfactorily: it has focused either on unauthorized migration (*e.g.* Espinosa and Massey 1999, McKenzie and Rapoport 2010, Stecklov *et al* 2010); *quasi*-legal migration (Parrado and Cerrutti 2003); migration where special documentation is not required (Entwisle *et al* 2007, Curran *et al* 2005); or has failed to distinguish among different legal statuses. Only one study (Massey and Espinosa 1997) has compared the role of migrant networks in authorized and unauthorized

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migration, but it is limited by its simple network indicators and difficulty in identifying the underlying mechanisms.

I focus on networks, legal status and migration between Senegal and Europe. Besides being rather politically stable since independence and harking from a region (West Africa) with great demographic and migration potential (Hatton and Williamson 2002), the Senegal case is a particularly good test case since a significant share of the Senegalese migrant population in Europe is known to have entered without authorization or to have overstayed their visa (Gabrielli 2010, Jabardo 2006). The concept of legality has transformed through the years and was not always an issue for Senegalese in Europe. Until 1974, citizens of former colonies of France (including Senegal) were allowed to enter France with only an “identity card” and needed neither residence nor work permits (Kofman *et al* 2010: 9) to reside and work legally. The relative migratory freedom of Senegalese to Italy and Spain was interrupted by these countries’ adhesion to Europe. Indeed, neither Spain (Gabrielli 2010: 61) nor Italy (REF?) required entry visas for Senegalese until 1985/6.

This study focuses on the causal mechanisms – particularly migrant network sources, resources – that drive male international migration between Senegal and Europe, and whether these mechanisms change whether we deal with authorized or unauthorized migration.<sup>2</sup> A second contribution is to distinguish between different aspects of legal status and migration: entry and initial stay. The latter is important theoretically when different mechanisms might power visa overstay, unauthorized stay and authorized stay and empirically when overstays of legal permits are widespread.<sup>3</sup> The study uses the MAFE-Senegal data (2008)<sup>4</sup>, collected in both Africa (Senegal) and Europe (France, Italy and Spain), and employs a competing risks event history analysis to analyze legal status at migration and the role of migrant networks.

The deeper issue at hand is whether social capital is more important when migration is more costly or risky. From a theoretical perspective, we would expect this to be true, when other conditions are similar. Unexpectedly however, very little empirical literature deals with this. Several reasons may be responsible: neglect of connecting theoretical and qualitative work with empirically-testable hypotheses; obstacles in dealing with alternative explanations; and general difficulties in capturing actual network mechanisms. This paper seeks to contribute in each of these three directions.

In the next section, we introduce the theoretical framework of the paper and review the literature on migrant networks and legal status at migration.

## 2. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND: MIGRANT NETWORKS & LEGAL STATUS OF MIGRATION

### *Theoretical perspectives*

A broad body of theoretical perspectives dominates explanations of international migration. The neoclassical economic perspective (further developed by Todaro 1969) suggested that individuals are motivated to migrate primarily by their goal to maximize income. The new economics of labor migration perspective (Stark and Bloom 1985) expanded the unit of analysis and argued that families or households play a key role in migration, deciding to send members abroad in order to distribute economic risk and access capital. At the same time, the social capital perspective has emphasized and demonstrated the importance of the social structures that link potential migrants to destination (Boyd 1989, Curran and Rivero-Fuentes 2003, Massey and Espinosa 1997). Several

<sup>2</sup> Other terms in the literature include illegal migration and undocumented migration. Here, we use the term unauthorized migration, which is preferred since it seems both accurate (unlike ‘undocumented’ migration when, in most cases, individuals have a passport or other identification/documentation) and politically neutral (unlike ‘illegal’ migration). In principal, our focus of study are individuals who, to the best of our knowledge, have always traveled voluntarily and may have sometime hired a *passseur* or human smuggler to help them enter a country without authorization. Human smuggling is distinct from the grave problem of human *trafficking*, which involves: involuntary movement, long(or short)-term exploitation, interdependency with organized crime, and the possibility that the individual will be recruited for criminal work (Bakrektarevic 2000, as quoted by Aronowitz 2001: 165). According to de Haas (2008: 10), human trafficking is rather rare in the West African-Europe context.

<sup>3</sup> In 2003, Spain’s former Secretary for Aliens’ Affairs and Immigration, Jaime Ignacio González, argued that ‘those who enter under the appearance of legality’ are a much bigger problem than unauthorized entries (Carling 2007: 321 quoting Romero 2003: 20).

<sup>4</sup> The MAFE project is coordinated by INED (C. Beauchemin) and is formed, additionally by the Université Catholique de Louvain (B. Schoumaker), Maastricht University (V. Mazzucato), the Université Cheikh Anta Diop (P. Sakho), the Université de Kinshasa (J. Mangalu), the University of Ghana (P. Quartey), the Universitat Pompeu Fabra (P. Baizan), the Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas (A. Gonzalez-Ferrer), FIERI (Forum Internazionale ed Europeo di Ricerche sull’Immigrazione; E. Castagnone), and the University of Sussex (R. Black). For more details, see: <http://www.mafeproject.com/>

recent studies have integrated all three perspectives (Liu 2011, Munshi 2003, Palloni et al 2001, Steklov et al 2010).

These major theoretical perspectives also may make some suggestions regarding what powers migrations of varying legal status. With regards to the neoclassical economic perspective's cost-benefit model, we would expect that the costs of authorized migration increase as the number of permits decrease and waiting time, official (and legal) fees rise (Massey and Espinosa 1997: 941). At the same time, increasing risks of apprehension is expected to be related to decreasing chances of unauthorized migration. With regards to the new economics of labor migration model, households or families strategize to send members abroad through authorized or unauthorized migration, depending on the economic and social capital resources available within the household. However, a weakness in this model has been identified by Poeze (2010): its limitations in accounting for *mortal* or bodily risk – the majority of parents of boat migrants appear to support their children's unauthorized migration despite its high mortal risk (Mbow and Penda 2008).

Finally, the social capital perspective anticipates both negative and positive impacts of social capital on authorized and unauthorized migration (Portes 1998). However, barriers lie in documenting this. First, the migrant social capital literature has been limited by its ability to capture actual migrant network mechanisms and has instead settled for proxies of social capital. In recent years, progress has been made in this direction. Garip (2008) analyzed how the exact sources and resources the migrant network offers are related to migration, while Liu (2011) extended this analysis to international migration and personal weak ties. Second, despite theoretical writing to the contrary (Portes 1998), thorough empirical investigation of possible negative effects of migrant networks in migration is completely missing. So far, empirical studies limit their scope by only theorizing and showing *positive* influences of migrant networks on migration.

### *Existing literature*

Despite the limitations mentioned above, several studies examine the role of migrant networks in migrations of different legal status. However, the empirical literature has been limited to unauthorized migration in the Mexico-U.S. context (for example, see Massey and García España 1997, Donato *et al* 1992, Palloni *et al* 2003, Donato *et al* 2008) and from Albania (Steklov *et al* 2010); *quasi*-legal migration where migration law is not routinely enforced (Parrado and Cerrutti 2003 for Paraguay-Argentina migration); and on migration which does not require special documentation such as most internal migration (see Entwisle *et al* 2007 and Curran *et al* 2005 for Thai internal migration) and international migration where bi- or multi-lateral international agreements ensure freedom of movement: currently, this is the case in the EU's Schengen area, within parts of Africa itself (de Haas 2008). Indeed, the study of migrant networks and true legal or authorized migration has been largely neglected, and there is only one existing comparisons of legal and unauthorized migration (Massey and Espinosa 1997).

Existing studies have found a robust role for strong-tied family networks (parents and siblings) for unauthorized migration (Donato 2008, Singer and Massey 1998), quasi-legal migration (Parrado and Cerrutti 2003) and internal migration (Entwisle *et al* 2007). In comparison, the influence of non-personal weak-ties networks (via community-level migration prevalence) is less (Curran *et al* 2005) or possibly gendered (Steklov *et al* 2010). There is evidence that the nature of networks impacts the forms of migration: Donato 2008 and Singer and Massey 1998 have shown that an individual's mode of unauthorized border crossing (alone, accompanied by family or friends, accompanied by a *coyote*) is influenced by the kind of network they have.

To date, only two studies appear to have compared the role of social capital in authorized and unauthorized migrations.<sup>5</sup> First, Massey and Espinosa (1997) studied the probability of first-time

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<sup>5</sup> In addition, one descriptive study, the 1997/1998 Push-Pull Project, that found that similar proportions of legal and unauthorized Egyptian migrants (in Italy), Ghanaian migrants (in Italy), Senegalese migrants (in Spain), and Moroccan migrants (in Spain) had migrant networks (family and friends) at destination before migrating (Schoorl *et al* 2000: 102-103). However, the limited nature of this analysis (a cross-sectional comparison of migrants of different origins and destinations) prevents explaining why some individuals move towards migration, while other remain at home; whether migrant networks play an important role in migration in general, and the legal status at migration, specifically; and whether these effects hold once individual and household characteristics are controlled for.

Mexico-U.S. migration with and without documents. Social capital raised the likelihood of both, but having a migrant parent and/or number of migrant siblings (migrant defined as anyone who had ever migrated to the U.S.) had a much larger effect on legal migration than on unauthorized migration. Also, sharing a household with an individual who had been legalized under the 1986 IRCA raised the likelihood of both legal and unauthorized migration, but especially legal, while the proportion of migrants in the origin community raised only the probability of unauthorized migration. Not included in Massey and Espinosa's analysis were non-household family members and friends. Second, Fussell (2004) ran parallel models of legal and unauthorized migration. She analyzed both the first and most recent trip. Having a migrant parents and siblings who migrated previously raised the likelihood of both unauthorized and legal migration. Since the models were separate, it is not possible to directly compare the effects of migrant networks. Fussell aimed to compare how individuals hailing from different communities (rural interior, urban interior and Tijuana) had different determinants of migration, and found that for undocumented migration from urban interior communities, family networks had especially strong effects, as compared to that hailing from rural interior communities.

### 3. RESEARCH MOTIVATION

A systematic comparison of the role of migrant networks on authorized and unauthorized migration is important on several levels. First, in the overall effort to clarify network mechanisms, it is important to compare authorized and unauthorized migration directly. The migrant network literature has not yet explored whether migrant networks play a more important role where migration costs are higher. Second, it can help bridge a gap between network theory and empirical study. Few studies anticipate and test that migrant networks may *dissuade* migration. Third, authorized and unauthorized migrations have different consequences for the individual migrant and the larger society as a whole. Indeed, legal status impact an individual's prospects of integration in the labor market, social integration and whether circular migration is a possibility for them. Empirical differences between the two should be made clear. Fourth, the public conception of migration is that it is largely unauthorized. Studies that clarify the dynamics of authorized migration or compare them to unauthorized migration can help shift this.

Furthermore, the empirical literature has also failed to address the difference between authorized/unauthorized entry and *stay*. Other scholars have emphasized the importance of distinguishing between legal/unauthorized entry and legal/unauthorized stay (de Haas 2008: 13) in order to move beyond static constructs of legality and migration and to capture its actual dynamism (Schrover *et al*, 2008: 26). The scant empirical evidence that does exist confirms the incidence of unauthorized stays (from overstays of tourist visas, for example). In the Push-Pull Project's analysis of unauthorized stays, about 15% of Ghanaians in Italy and 36% of Senegalese in Spain had overstayed a visa, while fewer individuals (7% of Ghanaians, and 15% of Senegalese) had entered the country without authorization (Schoorl *et al* 2000: 101). Among Egyptians in Italy and Moroccans in Spain, however, the proportion which had entered the country without authorization was similar to that which had overstayed a visa. Also, there are political reasons for a comprehensive analysis of legal and unauthorized entries and stays (Carling 2007: 321).

This paper aims to contribute in explaining how migrant networks impact authorized migration; compare the impact of migrant networks on authorized and unauthorized migration and whether this depends on the composition of the network; and, finally, whether legal entry and legal stay employ different network mechanisms. First, however, I explore and clarify the migration decision-making process.

### 4. MIGRATION DECISION-MAKING

Figure 1 lists the requirements for a tourist, business and student visa from the French embassy in Dakar, Senegal, as of Sept. 2011.

[Figure 1 about here]

In a scenario of exclusive use of authentic documents, visa requirements limit eligible individuals to those with sufficient employment success (in terms of being a salaried employee in the formal sector, for example), human capital and economic resources. The documents necessary for the tourist visa application are only available to those employed in the formal sector. However, in the most recent data available (2004), the formal sector (those with a NINEA or taxpayer number, or employers or the self-employed who keep accounting books) made up a mere 6.2% share of the total economically active population in Senegal (World Bank 2007: 26). It follows then that very few individuals have access to the tourist visa application process, and fewer still to that of the student visa. And for these fortunate few, established migrant networks at destination with the proper housing and financial status are the key to a successful visa application.<sup>6</sup>

Accounting for many different paths to migration (use of authentic and/or forged documents, authorized or unauthorized entry, etc.), Figure 2 displays a flowchart for migration decision-making. It starts by identifying those likely to migrate with authorization: individuals who have a steady, high-paying job in the formal sector and a hefty bank account; students who have won a scholarship to study in Europe; individuals whose relatives in Europe are able and willing to sponsor their migration. It continues with individuals who can secure cash to buy a tourist visa for an authorized entry, but – in the case they stay on past visa expiration – whose trajectories will lead to visa overstay or unauthorized stay. The flowchart ends with individuals who are likely to migrate without authorization, but are able to accrue cash for such a journey, or have a contact with someone who will bring them for no cost.

Key to each decision is a desire/risk calculation which accounts for the financial costs, social costs, physical costs (bodily injury or death), the risk of failure (related, in part, to border enforcement by destination countries), as well as access to legal status at destination (legal status vs. legal work, extraordinary regularizations, policies on family reunification, etc). Figure 3 and 4 summarize, respectively: the costs and risks of authorized and unauthorized entry; and those of authorized stay, overstay and unauthorized stay.

[Figure 2 about here]

### *Financial Costs*

The economic and social costs to migration appear to be different for authorized and unauthorized migrations. The economic costs of unauthorized entry are more difficult to estimate, and there are different estimates ( *passeurs*, transport, false documents, bribes, daily necessities, etc.) of how much it costs to cross from Africa to Europe. In 2005, Petros (2005: 5) estimated the cost of an Africa-Europe trip to be \$6,533. Yet, this estimation is problematic since it averages out very different kinds of trips. For example, it seems clear that it is definitely more costly to reach Europe from the south of Africa, than from the north. Other estimates include US \$880 for only the Morocco-Canary Island crossing, US \$480 – US \$1930 for Senegal-Canary Island crossing, and US \$385 – US \$1260 Nouadhibou (Mauritania)-Canary Islands (de Haas 2008 quoting UNODC 2006) and, in 2003, US \$800 for Francophone sub-Saharan Africans (and US \$1200 for Anglophone individuals) to cross from Morocco to Spain (de Haas 2008 quoting Lahlou 2003). On the other hand, authorized entry appears to be much less expensive in terms of up-front payment: entry visa fees (54€ student visa, 61€ for tourist, family or professional visa) and a round-trip plane ticket, especially in the off-season (eg: 350€ Dakar-Madrid 468€ Dakar-Rome, 516€ Dakar-Paris from [www.rumbo.es](http://www.rumbo.es)).

### *Social and Physical Costs*

Social costs may be much higher for unauthorized migration than for authorized migration. In her study of unsuccessful boat migrants between Senegal and Spain, Poeze (2010) describes two different models which motivate this kind of unauthorized migration: individuals searching for independence from familial hierarchies and those who are obeying just such hierarchies. It is not yet clear which model dominates in the Senegal-Europe context. However, in other contexts, unauthorized migration appears to work against familial expectations. A migrant wishing to enter

<sup>6</sup> The few exceptions, not dependent on established networks at destination, include winners of official scholarships and individuals wealthy enough to pay for a hotel reservation.

Europe unauthorized risks a more dangerous and uncertain journey, so elders and household are likely to be against such a choice, despite promises of remittances (as is the case for Pakistani migrants to Europe, documented by Ahmad 2008). At the same time, peer social pressure works the other way: unauthorized migration, despite its risks, appears to promise freedom from strict expectations and limited social and economic options and is thus very attractive to entire cohorts of young people, especially young men (Ahmad 2008, Poeze 2010). Ahmad (2008: 144) even argues that unauthorized migration is a form of “youthful subversion”. Social costs of legal migration appear to be lower since the voyage does not have the same inherent mortal danger.

The physical risks of unauthorized migration, especially boat migration, are much higher than authorized migration. There is the chance of injury and even death. Poeze (2010: 76) writes that people are well-informed of risks and thus only a small minority chooses the most risky routes. In doing so, they rely on religious and magical practices (like wearing an amulets, taking special baths at sea, or having sacrifices done in their honor) to protect them (Poeze 2010: 77).

#### *The Risk of Failure*

Unauthorized migration is much more likely to fail than authorized migration. The process of securing documents is costly and time-consuming, but once documents are secured, “failure” to migrate is rare. On the other hand, the success of unauthorized migration depends on a myriad of factors, including: the *porteur*'s skill, weather, luck at sea, a border guard's behavior. It is especially related to the changing politics of border enforcement. Both Spain and Italy share a border with Africa and have negotiated their own investment in border enforcement and the involvement of the European Union. Spain's high-tech *SIVE* system has received much press, but its actual efficacy is questionable (Carling 2007). At the same time, Italy's agreements with Libya and Malta to halt and manage unauthorized migration flows, off of Italian shores have prompted queries from the European Union (Nascimbene 2008) and critique. A *Time* article called it “outsourcing immigration control” (Faris 2011). The overarching trend is that destination countries are investing more resources in border control, while the efficacy of their efforts remains ambiguous. Nevertheless, the news about such changes is likely to impact potential migrants.

#### *Access to Legal Status at Destination*

First, in all three destination countries included in this study (France, Spain and Italy), there have been extraordinary regularization programs of unauthorized migrants already living at destination. In France, major amnesties happened in 1968, 1974, 1981 and 1995 (Constant 2005). Spain and Italy's campaigns have been more recent, and it is possible that these mechanisms for the legalization for undocumented Senegalese have increased the attractiveness of Spain and Italy as possible destinations for potential migrants. In Spain, these happened in 1986, 1991, 1996, 2000-2001 and 2005 (Arango *et al* 2005). In Italy, the campaigns took place in 1986, 1990, 1995, 1998, 2002 (Levinson, 2005). The regularization programs represent the ambiguity of immigration policies, especially in Southern Europe (Baldwin-Edwards 2002), and some argue that regularizations make unauthorized migration more attractive, since potential migrants are hopeful that a new regularization program may be on the horizon. Even more concretely, the regularization of network members at destination facilitates further migration in various ways: enables them to sponsor migrants through legal family reunification; widens job opportunities and thereafter the resources (including official/unofficial housing and funds or economic sponsorship) that they are able to offer potential migrants.

Second, there have been important changes to legal family reunification policies in France, Italy and Spain since 1973 (see Annex). This is significant since legal family reunification has been the primary path of legal migration to Europe since the 1970's (Kofman *et al* 2010). In general, governments have narrowed eligibility for legal family reunification and have raised the requirements that the sponsoring individual has to meet. This results in restricting access to this important form of legal migration, and may decrease the influence of strongly tied migrant networks in general.

Third, having a work permit does not guarantee access to legal work. Suarez-Navaz (1997) documents the distinctions between immigration legal status and legal work. For example, legal

workers may work 'illegally', in the underground economy or for employers who are unable or unwilling to issue a legal contract. Also, workers whose legal permit only allows them to work in a specific sector may find work outside; this is unauthorized work as well.

### *Entry versus Stay*

Since visa overstay is purported to be a widespread phenomena (Gabrielli 2010, Jabardo 2006), it is important to understand whether its determinants differ from that of unauthorized entry and what the role of migrant networks is. Although legal entry followed by visa overstay and unauthorized entry result in the same end – unauthorized residence at destination, there are reasons to believe the two are quite different: visa overstay is safer and potential migrants of this route will not face much familial opposition; overstay is only accessible to those who have the proper economic and social capital resources to submit a successful visa application; finally, visa overstay might be a decision made once Ego is already at destination. It is yet unclear, which will have more in common: legal entry/residence; visa overstay; or unauthorized entry.

## 5. CONTEXT

The roots of Senegalese migration to Europe are found in the colonial (and later ex-colonial) link to France and its labor shortage in the 20<sup>th</sup> century. France especially facilitated immigration by members of its colonies and ex-colonies after World War II, with French automobile companies systematically recruiting healthy well-educated workers from Senegal (mostly of the soninkés and pulaars ethnicities), during the mostly prosperous 1960's (Jabardo 2006: 37). However, with the recessions of 1967-1968, and the oil crisis of 1973, these workers suffered especially. Following in the footsteps of Germany, France halted the entrance of foreign workers, limiting migration to legal family reunification in 1974 with certain exceptions in construction, mining and seasonal agricultural work (Constant 2005: 274).

In the late 1970's and early 1980's, as France continued to be a less hospitable destination, some large agricultural producers in Spain and Italy began experimenting with a more capital and labor-intensive and export-orientated monoculture model (Hudson and Lewis 1985: 30). New Senegalese migrants (of the same soninkés and pulaars ethnicities as the autoworkers in France) arrived and worked in Spain (initially Catalunya)<sup>7</sup> and southern Italy, with hopes to move to France in the not-so-distant future (Jabardo 2006: 39). From the mid-1970's on, propelled largely by the groundnut agricultural crisis in their region of origin (Gabrielli 2010: 67), members of the Mouride sufi brotherhood branched out their religious and commercial networks from their strongholds in Paris and Marseille to Italy (and the U.S), and later to Spain (and elsewhere in Europe) (Lacomba and Moncusi 2006: 74). This group is ethnically Wolof and almost exclusively works as wholesalers, commerciants in fairs and markets and as street peddlers.

Initially, the importance of the tourist industry – and thus the need to issue tourist visas quickly, and the reluctance to heighten controls in airports and ports – as well as their geographical proximity made Spain, Italy and their Southern European neighbors, relative easy to access (King and Rybaczuk 1993: 178). By the mid-1980's, responding to pressure from the European Union, both Spain and Italy had taken steps to control more their borders. For example, Spain's 1985 immigration law essentially "closed" the borders (Jabardo 2006: 72). Spain's need for agricultural labor grew throughout the 1980's and 1990's, and Senegalese of varying ethnicities and origin went to work. In Italy, there has been a significant internal migration of Senegalese to northern Italy since the late 1980's. Their subsequent and stable employment in well-paid industrial jobs by Senegalese, and this has maintained Italy's attractiveness for many Senegalese would-be migrants, especially the well-educated (Grillo and Riccio 2004). Finally, the dramatic devaluation of Senegal's Western Africa CFA (*Communauté financière d'Afrique*) currency on January 1, 1994 and continued low agricultural productivity and rural flight, has likely led to greater pressures to migrate out of Senegal (FIND REF).

<sup>7</sup> Many of the first-wave Senegalese migrants to Spain did so with a Gambian passport due to porous borders and shared cultures between Gambia and Senegal, and the restrictions placed on out-migration of labor force by the Senegalese government (Jabardo 2006, 25).

## 6. WORKING HYPOTHESES

First, authorized and unauthorized migrations will be affected differently by strong ties. According to Poeze (2010), we might expect that certain strong ties can dissuade unauthorized migration through two mechanisms: 1. By facilitating authorized migration instead of unauthorized migration through visas or hopes of getting one 2. By opposing unauthorized migration and relating this to future acceptance, aid or remittances. At the same time, we can expect that strong ties can encourage authorized migration through financial assistance, help with paperwork and housing at destination. In other words, *I expect that strong tie networks will dissuade unauthorized entry, while encouraging authorized entry.*

Second, weak personal ties are expected to stimulate migration in general: while some weak ties may, in fact, provide resources for the trip, I expect the main effect to be through information. Ego learns that there is the possibility of a successful crossing and life at destination. This changes and impacts Ego's risk equation. *I expect that weak tie networks will raise the likelihood of both authorized and unauthorized entry.*

Third, we expect a difference between migrant network members who currently live in Europe and those who have already returned to Senegal. Since return migrants from Europe appear to be largely excluded from the Senegalese primary sector labor market at origin (Mezger and Flahaux 2010) and relegated into self-employment, they are likely viewed as "not successful". Indeed, there is evidence that households that only include return migrants are worse off than those who include at least one current migrant (Mezger 2008). Also, return migrants may speak more accurately of life at destination, or at least be unable to maintain the idealistic, bravado-filled façades that many current migrants nourish whilst on trips home (Ahmad 2008: 145), and thus stifle migration ambitions. In addition, return migrants (especially parents or uncles) may encourage offspring to improve their situation at origin (through study or work in businesses birthed from migration remittances) without migrating themselves, or at least show a strong preference for legal migration. Indeed, *I expect that return migrants in one's network (especially in the absence of current migrants) will dissuade both authorized and unauthorized migrations since they lack financial resources to help and may even dissuade with real stories of life at destination and their own lack of success (information).*

Fourth, I expect that authorized and unauthorized entry will take advantage of different social capital resources. Specifically, authorized migration depends on the resources and know-how of navigating a complex paperwork process *prior to* migration and thus requires formal planning and a lengthy wait. Nearly all paths to legal entry (legal family reunification, tourist/student visas, etc.) require documenting sufficient levels of financial resources and housing quality at destination (see Figure 1 and Annex). These are usually provided by a trusted person from Ego's family or home community - a member of Ego's migrant network. At the same time, unauthorized migration requires other kinds of information (e.g. how to contact a  *passeur*), and resources (including paying the  *passeur*, negotiating transit country stays), but does not involve wading through a bureaucratic process nor contacting potential "sponsors" and can then be more spontaneous. As a result, *I expect that the amount of network resources will benefit more heavily authorized entry, while it will not have a similar effect on unauthorized migration.*

Fifth, the impact of the diversity of migrant network resources is less clear. Since I expect unauthorized migration to be governed by risk calculation, it follows that the more diverse network resources are, the greater the spread of risks, and thus the greater likelihood of unauthorized migration. At the same time, I do not expect that diversity benefits authorized migration. Authorized migration requires a focused paperwork process and resources in one entry into a specific country, while unauthorized migration may especially benefit from knowledge and contacts in a variety of destination and transit countries. *I expect that diversity of network resources will increase the likelihood of unauthorized migration, but have no similar effect on authorized migration.*



Sixth, in the analysis about authorized stay, visa overstay and unauthorized stay, there are two competing hypotheses. On one hand, *if visa overstay is a conscious and pre-conceived strategy of migrants, I expect that they will need even more migrant network tie and social capital resources than migrants who expect to experience authorized or unauthorized stay. On the other hand, if visa overstay is an accidental and more improvised situation, I expect that their migrant network requirements will be quite similar to or less than those of authorized stayers.*

The main hypotheses are summarized in Table 1.

### Complementary explanations

Two different complementary explanations are important in international migration studies. First, spousal reunification can reflect the provisions of legal family reunification or household decision-making that leads to the migration of one or more members. Past studies (Liu 2011) have shown the importance of accounting for this explanation, so I do so here in this paper.

Second, several complementary (or ‘competing’, according to Palloni *et al* 2001) explanations, besides the migrant network hypothesis, can explain the correlation of household migration with one’s own migration. Palloni *et al* (2001) provide a concise list: a concerted family strategy to maximize household income (the neoclassical economic model); a concerted family strategy to diversify risk by sending some of its members abroad (the new economic model of labor migration); selection into networks by the same factors that influence the likelihood of migration (selection); or that individuals in the same networks share certain unobserved characteristics that influence migration (unobserved heterogeneity). I also account for this here.

## 7. DATA & METHODS

### 7A. Data

The longitudinal data used in the study is from the MAFE-Senegal (Migration between Africa and Europe) Project (2008). The data is based on a retrospective biographical questionnaire with housing, union, children, work and migration histories documented. Detailed information is recorded for each union, child, and period (eg. housing, work). While individuals provided general information about the entire work period, they were asked to specify much of the housing information to the beginning of each housing period (including who lived in the household). Additional information about migrant networks, documentation status, remittances and properties is available. About 600 current Senegalese migrants in France, Italy and Spain and nearly 1100 residents of the region of Dakar were interviewed in 2008.<sup>8</sup>

In addition to the indicators capturing time duration (age, ln(age)), period effects<sup>9</sup> and migrant networks, the following explanatory variables are used in the analysis:

Origin, Individual and migration-related characteristics

- A) Urban origin (ref: rural)
- B) An indicator for whether Ego’s father was deceased or unknown
- C) Father’s education: no formal schooling (ref.), primary schooling, secondary and above
- D) Religious affiliation: (Muslim brotherhoods of Khadre, Layène, Mouride, Tidiane (ref.) and a category for “other Muslim”; Catholic and other Christian
- E) An indicator for whether Ego was the firstborn child
- F) Number of siblings
- G) Ego’s highest level of education: no school or pre-school, primary (ref.), lower secondary, higher secondary or higher

<sup>8</sup> We do not expect the sampling strategy of urban Dakar to upward bias our results. Indeed, we might even expect the opposite. For the Mexican case, Fussell and Massey (1994) find that community-level social capital is less influential in urban areas than in rural areas.

<sup>9</sup> The periods are before 1985, 1985-1993, 1994-1998, 1999-2003, 2004-2007. In 1985, France introduced a compulsory visa policy for Senegalese. In 1994, Senegal experienced a grave economic crisis when its currency, the CFA franc, was unlinked from the French franc and devalued by half. The rest of the periods were made to be of approximately equal length.

#### Time-varying (year-by-year) individual information

- H) Marital status
- I) An indicator for whether Ego was in a polygamous union
- J) Number of children
- K) Labor force status: working (ref.), unemployed, studying, working at home, inactive
- L) Property ownership: land, housing, business

#### Time-varying contextual factors:

- M) Urban population growth in Senegal (%)
- N) GDP per growth per capita in Senegal (%)

Since our interest is adult migration, we start the clock at age 17, with the first possible migration to Europe at age 18. Due to the low incidence of female unauthorized migration, I have restricted the sample to 761 adult males. All individuals in the sample were born in Senegal.

This data source has certain limitation: it is retrospective and is vulnerable to recall bias; and the origin sample excludes households where all members have migrated (to Europe, within Africa or within Senegal). The latter is a potential problem for use of the household questionnaire data, but not for the biographical data analyzed in this paper. Furthermore, analyses of the MAFE-Senegal destination samples suggest they are largely free of selection bias (Beauchemin and Gonzalez Ferrer 2011). The consequences for migrant networks analysis (Liu 2011) include: an over-representation of relationships that are active at survey time; an over-representation of strong ties compared to weak ties due to the wording of the survey; an over-representation of network members who *actually* helped. Nevertheless, we do not expect a systematic difference along these lines between those who migrated with or without authorization.

#### 7B. Methods

In order to account for the dynamics of international migration, discrete-time event history (or survival) analysis is employed. Specifically, I use a competing risks (multinomial logit regression) model to predict legal status at migration. A competing risks design helps clarify and compare different outcomes. This has been traditionally and comprehensively applied to studies of contraceptive use (eg. Steele and Curis 2003), fertility (eg. Lillard 1993), divorce (eg. Lillard et al 1995), and labor market (eg. D'Addio and Rosholm 2005), and is less common in migration studies (for exceptions, see Massey and Espinosa 1997; Davis and Winters 2001; Davis, Steklov and Winters 2002). Based on the above literature review and theoretical background, I argue that it is very important to distinguish between legal and unauthorized migration, and a competing risks (multinomial logit regression) model allows us to analyze possible differences. The outcomes of interest are explained next.

#### 7C. Indicators

##### 7C1. Dependent variables – Legal Status at Migration

There are two sets of dependent variables: legal or unauthorized first-time entry into Europe; and subsequent legal and unauthorized stay in Europe. The data includes year-by-year information on legal status (residence and work permits).

In the first set of analysis, we capture legal status *only* in the year of migration. The dependent variable is an indicator that, in the year when Ego first moves to France, Italy or Spain directly from Senegal, takes the value of 1 ('authorized first-time entry to Europe') if they have authorization to be in the country (temporary visa or residency permit), and 2 ('unauthorized first-time entry to Europe') if not.<sup>10</sup> We focus on 1<sup>st</sup> time migration, since it has higher costs (Deléchat 2001) and different mechanisms than subsequent migration (eg. Donato *et al* 2008, Parrado and Cerrutti 2001). For the sake of precision and robustness of the results, moves from Senegal to other destinations (including those in Europe but not France, Italy or Spain) were censored at the year of migration.

<sup>10</sup> First migration to Europe was chosen rather than the first international migration since the costs and barriers to migration are quite different across the Africa-Europe border, in comparison to borders between African countries, or those between Africa and North America for example.

For all previous years, the dependent variable is coded 0. The dependent variable is also coded 0 for all right-censored cases, individuals who never (or had not at the time of survey) migrated outside of Senegal.

In the second part of the analysis, we re-orientate the analysis towards authorized or unauthorized stay, with special attention to changes in status. If an individual remains at destination, these changes could include a move from unauthorized entry towards authorized legal status (e.g. extraordinary regularization, obtaining a work contract and permit, marriage to a EU national, etc.) or from authorized entry towards unauthorized legal status (e.g. overstay of a tourist/student visa or temporary permit, losing work contract and permit, etc.). In this part of the analysis, we are particularly interested in visa overstays.

Here, the dependent variable is an indicator that, in the year when Ego first moves to France, Italy or Spain directly from Senegal, takes the value of 1 ('authorized initial stay') if the individual reports legal entry and authorization to be in the country in the year following migration; 2 ('visa overstay') if the individual reports legal entry, but *no* authorization the following year; 3 ('unauthorized initial stay') if the individual reports unauthorized entry *and* unauthorized stay in the country in the year following migration.

### 7C2. *Measuring Networks and Tie Strength*

Respondents were first asked to name all close family members (parents, siblings, partners and children) who had lived at least one year abroad, and construct a year-by-year itinerary of the countries where they had lived since. Subsequently, they were asked to list *the other relatives and friends* on whom they could count on (or could have counted on) to receive or help them to migrate out of Senegal, who had also lived at least one year abroad. For the sake of precision, I restrict migrant network indicators to years lived in Europe. Years when migrant network members lived elsewhere are excluded, in order to avoid capturing general imitation behavior and thus overestimating the impact of the migrant networks. All migrant network indicators are captured at year (t-1).

There are, however, a few potential sources of bias in measuring the other relatives and friends migrant network. First, it is a selected category: a comprehensive list of friends and other relatives was *not* solicited, only those "close" enough that Ego could have counted on them for migration help. Also excluded are those who migrated but were not available to help. Bias is introduced only *if* migrants and non-migrants respond to the question differently. In any case, I expect any bias to run against the hypotheses.<sup>11</sup> Second, due to the retrospective nature of the questionnaire and recall bias, relationships still active at the time of the survey are more likely to be included. If this is related to its quality and likelihood to help, it introduces bias in favor of the hypotheses, and the impact of migrant networks would be overestimated. This is an issue especially for friendships. Below, I detail my attempts to downward bias the friendship network indicators. Finally, migrants who actually received help may be more likely to list these people, while those who did not receive help may not list people who could have *potentially* helped. I expect that this issue was mostly preempted by rigorous training of interviewers to list *all* extended family, friends and acquaintances the respondent *could have* counted on – *whether or not they did help*. In cases that it was not, this could lead to an overestimation of the impact of migrant networks.

Analysis of friendship ties is especially troublesome. Friendships may be endogenous to migration: individuals may seek out friendships which help them migrate. My approach to controlling endogeneity is two-fold. First, I include *only* friendships formed in Senegal before either individual had ever lived abroad. While it is possible that one (or both) individuals already intend to migrate, neither has personal migration experience from which to draw advice and resources. Second, I distinguish between short-term (less than 3 years) and long-term friends (3 years or more). Only

<sup>11</sup> For example, since migrants (especially in retrospect) have a clearer idea of what "help to migrate" looked like and who provided it, they may list very few people in this category. In comparison, non-migrants (being more idealistic) may list more people (even an exhaustive list of migrants they know). The network effect for migration would then be biased down. The problem is if the opposite is true: if migrants tend to list more other family and friends than non-migrants. This may be a problem if non-migrants are less aware of the migration experience of their extended family than migrants. However, since network measures are restricted to Europe, and migration to Europe is still rather remarkable, I argue that the second scenario should be much outweighed by the first: migrants screening their potential lists for would-be help and non-migrants euphorically listing everybody they know.

long-term friends, less likely to be a source of endogeneity, are included in the models. This excludes all spur-of-the-moment friendships. For example, for a potential 18 year-old migrant, we will only include friendships formed before the age of 15. Friendships lacking duration information are also excluded. This two-pronged approach helps make the friendship network analysis more robust.

### *7C3. Strength of Tie*

Although it is difficult to capture the quality or nature of relationships with the data available, the data analyzed in this study has one clear advantage: its dynamic (time-varying) nature. Few theorists recognize that networks are ever-changing, and network indicators rarely, if ever, capture the dynamism of time – how relationships (and networks of relationships) change over time, growing stronger or weaker, and end – and how this dynamism affects the networks' impact on the phenomenon of interest. Here, I account for important year-by-year changes in the migrant network (country of residence and death), essential constant network information (link to Ego, gender, whether Ego thought the migrant could help, year met), all in conjunction with the plethora of dynamic data available about the survey respondent (family/household situation, housing situation, legal document status, labor market situation, property-ownership, etc.).

The data essentially includes two lists of network members (an exhaustive list of migrants in the close family, and a selected list of other family and friends), and my analysis of weak ties reflects this dichotomy. The exhaustive list of close family ties allows me: to test the network hypothesis net of the alternative explanations; and to establish a baseline from which to test the effect of weak ties. Developing weak tie indicators from only the second list adds robustness to my argument. Respondents were asked to evaluate two different dimensions of their weak ties network: first, whether a person was able to help them; and second, whether a person was willing (and available) to do so. Thus, I know that the “reciprocal services” dimension (or the possibility thereof) characterizes the weak ties network.

Therefore, I distinguish between strong ties (parents and siblings) and weak ties (other relatives and friends). This is well-justified through the literature (for examples, see Palloni et al 2001, Massey and Espinosa 1997, Toma and Vause 2010, Liu 2011). Again, in order to avoid confounding the migrant network hypothesis with competing explanations, spouses and children are *not* included in any measure of migrant network.

### *7C4. Current and Return migrant networks*

Here, I distinguish between the locations of migrant network members in a given year. The current and return migrant network indicators signal, respectively, the number of network members living in Europe (Spain, Italy and France) and Senegal in a given year.

### *7C5. Resources of migrant networks (Amount and Diversity)*

Measures of whether a migrant received information or help from network members, and how this influenced their decision to migrate, are not available in this data. According to Garip (2008: 597-8), this leads to an identification problem: it is not possible to distinguish between imitation or contagion effects and true migrant network effects (information, assistance or resources provided). My analysis is not immune to this critique. However, I argue that imitation effects are less a problem here: given the nature of the survey (network members are only included when Ego remembers their exact migration itineraries); and the nature of weak-tied personal networks compared to village-level networks (in the first, useful information is more likely to be communicated without Ego actively seeking it, and resources or assistance available).

Instead, we capture the amount and diversity of migrant social capital resources. First, I argue that, with each year a migrant spends at destination, the more information and resources they can make available to potential migrants. I use the cumulative network experience in Europe, as measured in years, in order to capture amount of migrant social capital. Second, we expect that a migrant network with more diverse resources (information about different destinations) will have a greater

breadth of information and resources, and expand the potential migrant's choices. I model my diversity index after Garip's 2008 diversity index (based on Shannon's 1948 entropy index):

$$Diversity = \frac{-\sum_{i=1}^n p_i \times \log(p_i)}{\log(n)} \times 10 ,$$

where  $n$  is the number of possible destinations, and  $p$  is the proportion of migration experience to each destination  $i$ . The index varies between a minimum diversity of 0 (all migration experience concentrated in one destination) and 10 (migration experience equally distributed among all destinations). I use four different categories for destinations, which exhaust the possibilities for all Senegalese would-be migrants: France, Italy, Spain and other (including the rest of the world).

#### *7C6. Complementary explanations (Household migrant networks and spousal reunification)*

##### *Complementary Explanation #1: Household decision-making (Household migrant network)*

The household migrant network indicator was constructed to weigh it against the migrant network hypothesis and towards the complementary explanations involving households. It was constructed with time-varying information from both the housing module (Ego's ties to other household members) and the migrant network module (Ego's link to migrants abroad). In the housing module, at the start of each housing spell, the survey includes Ego's links to all other household members (sister, for example), but *not* the exact identity (the sister's name). In the network module, there is a year-by-year accounting of network members who have lived abroad, where they have lived and their link to Ego. Accordingly, a very generous measure was used: if a household included *any* sister, *all* sisters in the migrant networks were considered household members *during the entire housing spell*. This was repeated for migrant brothers, mother, father and friends. Furthermore, if the household included any "other relative", all cousins, aunts/uncles, nieces/nephews and grandparents were categorized as household members during the entire housing spell. All household migrant network indicators were lagged by one year, in order to avoid capturing simultaneous migration by household members.

There are two important limitations. First, the household membership information is only available at the beginning of each housing spell, so the longer the housing spell lasts; the less accurate the information. Second, despite the possible multi-local nature of Senegalese families at origin (in some cases of polygamy or rural-urban migration, for example) and the influence of family members and elders outside the physical household, I can only account for Ego's current physical household.<sup>12</sup> I do, however, include polygamy as a control in all models.

##### *Complementary Explanation #2: Spousal reunification (Migrant Spouse)*

Since specific visa and residency permit information is not available, I proxied for the legal family reunification process<sup>13</sup> through whether Ego's spouse lived abroad in Europe. This proxy is again weighed against the migrant network hypotheses, by including all spouses in Europe, independent of their legal status and ability/desire to embark on the legal family reunification process. I lag the variable in order to avoid capturing simultaneous migration by the spouses.

## 8. RESULTS

### *8A. Authorized and Unauthorized Entry*

There are some differences between legal and unauthorized first-time entries into Europe. Table 2 shows some of the results of the competing risks model. First, unauthorized entry appears sensitive

<sup>12</sup> This is limited: Bass (2006) documents that the concept of the Senegalese family is rather fluid and can depend on a number of factors: sharing the same rite of passage and community; living and eating together and contributing to its social and economic life. Also, in a context of rural-urban migration, there may be members who contribute socially and economically but do not live in the physical household (Bass 2006: 90-91). However, I expect that the time-varying and super-generous nature of the household indicator will help reduce bias when testing it against the migrant network hypothesis.

<sup>13</sup> Since my interest is adult migration, I have not included possible family reunification of children into the models. Also, incidence of elderly migration (as a proxy for possible family reunification of elderly parents) appears to be negligible in my sample.

to macro-economic factors and period effects, while authorized entry is not. For example, the likelihood of unauthorized migration falls as the Senegalese economy (measured in GDP per capita growth) grows. There is no similar effect for authorized entry. Also, unauthorized entry appears to be an especially recent phenomenon: compared to the years before 1984, the likelihood of unauthorized entry since 1998 is quintuple. No period effects are found for authorized entry despite the changes in the regulation of legal migration. Second, certain origin characteristics are important. Individuals whose father was unknown or deceased are much less likely to migrate with authorization. Hailing from an urban hometown and being affiliated with certain religious Muslim brotherhoods (Mouride) raises one's likelihood to migrate unauthorized, in comparison to the Tidiane reference group: no such effect is found for authorized migration, although Catholics appear to be less likely to migrate with authorization. Meanwhile, the dampening effect of number of siblings is only found for authorized migration. At the same time, certain origin characteristics appear to encourage authorized migration. Having a father who received some primary education ( $p < 0.001$ ) raises the risk of migrating authorized. Third, individual educational and labor force status also impact one's chances of migrating with or without authorization. While one's chances to migrate authorized increase with higher secondary education, no significant effects of education on unauthorized migration are found. The former fits with the expectation that, besides family reunification, most avenues to authorized migration require higher levels of education (directly to access study visas, or indirectly by requiring involvement in the formal labor market which is only accessible to the privileged few). At the same time, those who were at home in year  $t-1$  were more likely to migrate with and without authorization, while those who were unemployed were more likely to do so unauthorized. Home ownership impacts the two migrations differently: lowering the risk of authorized migration, while increasing that of unauthorized migration.

### *Tie Strength*

Evidence in Table 3 supports the tie strength hypothesis. As anticipated, strong ties reduce the likelihood of unauthorized migration, but surprisingly are not significant in influencing authorized migration. The results for unauthorized migration support the model that unauthorized migrants are actually acting against traditional familial hierarchies, since the influence of migrants in the close family (parents and siblings) strongly dissuade unauthorized migration ( $p < 0.05$ ). On the other hand, weak ties raise the likelihood of both authorized ( $p < 0.001$ ) and unauthorized ( $p < 0.05$ ) migration. Once a spectrum of tie strength is accounted for (Table 3b), it is evident that friendships power the weak tie influence ( $p < 0.01$  for unauthorized,  $p < 0.001$  for authorized entry). Indeed, although the effect is not statistically significant, the stronger weak tie (uncles/nephews) seems to point to a negative influence on unauthorized migration.

### *Current and Return migrant networks*

There is some evidence for the hypotheses about current and return migrant networks (Table 4, Table 4A). Having a current migrant network increases both the likelihood of authorized ( $p < 0.001$ ) and unauthorized migrations ( $p < 0.01$ ), but the results for return migrant networks are not statistically significant (authorized migration) or even viable (unauthorized migration). Once I investigate further the impact of current or return network *size*, I see that each current migrant in an individual's network appears to increase their probability of migrating with authorization by 22% ( $p < 0.001$ ). Other effects are not significant.

### *Resources of Migrant Networks (Amount and Diversity)*

Table 5 shows that the evidence does not support the hypotheses about the amount of migrant social capital and appears to refute the hypothesis about diversity of migrant social capital. Results of the analysis of the amount of migrant social capital are not statistically significant and may suffer from sample size issues.

At the same time, the evidence for the diversity of migrant networks hypothesis is mixed. Overall, results seem to run against the hypothesis: diversity appears to raise the likelihood of legal migration ( $p < 0.10$ ) and dampen unauthorized migration, but results are not or only marginally significant statistically.

### *8B. Authorized Initial Stay, Visa Overstay and Unauthorized Initial Stay*

There is evidence that visa overstay is a pre-conceived strategy that requires a greater amount of migrant network ties and migrant social capital resources. First, both non-household ( $p < 0.05$ ) and household migrant networks ( $p < 0.001$ ) have a greater influence on visa overstay, than either authorized or unauthorized stay (Table 6). Second, the influence of weaker weak (friendship) ties is also largest for visa overstayers ( $p < 0.001$ , Table 6b). Third, having a current migrant network benefits most overstayers ( $p > 0.01$ , Table 7a), over those who stay with and without authorization.

In terms of social capital resources, visa overstayers benefit especially from a more diverse migrant network ( $p < 0.05$ ). All other effects are not statistically significant

### *8C. Complementary Explanation*

Throughout the analysis, there is consistent evidence for the Migrant Network Hypothesis, even when the migration decision-making explanation is controlled for.

The results show that the household migration decision-making explanation is important for authorized entry ( $p < 0.001$ , Table 3), as well as authorized initial stay ( $p < 0.05$ , Table 6) and visa overstay ( $p < 0.10$ , Table 6). However, its effects are not statistically significant for unauthorized entry nor for unauthorized initial stay. Since household decision-making has been key in the New Economics Model of Labor Migration, it may be time to revisit this and other migration theories in order to account for greater contextual complexity and the newest findings.

## **9. CONCLUSIONS**

This paper provides evidence that the migrant network mechanisms powering authorized and unauthorized migration are different. First, distinguishing between legal statuses at entry is important. While most migrant network ties appear to increase the likelihood of authorized entry, the same is not the case for unauthorized entry. The complementary explanation of household decision-making appears to pertain only to authorized migration.

Second, the evidence supports the proposition that unauthorized entry reflects an individualistic decision that defies familial disapproval (Ahmad 2008, Poeze 2010), rather than one that is obedient to either strategic household migration decision-making or other familial influences. In other words, I do not find support for Poeze's second model of young people conforming to the ambitions of elders (2010). Stronger network ties appear to dissuade unauthorized entry.

Third, studying legal status at entry is not enough: it is important to account for legal status of the migrant's initial stay. A contribution of this paper is documenting the importance of visa overstay and the key and special role of migrant networks in it. The evidence appears to support the idea that visa overstay is a migration strategy that is planned before migration, rather than the result of more spontaneous decision-making once the individual is at destination. Migrant networks are especially influential in visa overstays: having current migrants in one's network and a more diverse network greatly enhance the chances an individual will overstay a visa.

Finally, this study is just a beginning. This study has analyzed legal status at entry and initial stay, using primarily a binary outcome: authorized and unauthorized. Yet, we know that these labels may conceal a variety of situations. For example, authorized entry includes individuals with legal family reunification status, student visa status, work permits and tourist status. Future study would do well to investigate the finer differences among different categories of migrants. This study has analyzed first-time migration to Europe and first-time stays there. Future studies can and should deal with subsequent migrations. Also, the findings are specific to the Senegal-Europe setting. In order to understand them truly and unearth more generalized patterns, future study should explore migrant network mechanisms in different international settings. In addition, empirical quantitative study is intrinsically limited, more in-depth qualitative study of international migration is needed in order to understand the migration decision-making process at the individual level, especially those factors

and the reasoning that may lead to visa overstay.




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### 10. FIGURES (PRELIMINARY)



**FIGURE 2: MIGRATION DECISION-MAKING FLOWCHART**




FIGURE 3: COSTS AND RISKS OF AUTHORIZED AND UNAUTHORIZED ENTRY

Costs and risks		Authorized entry	Unauthorized entry
Actual Trip	Financial costs	High	Low
	Risk to physical safety	None	High
	Risk of apprehension	None	High
	Risk of failed attempt	None	High
Life at destination	Difficulty in finding housing	Low	Medium
	Difficulty in integrating in legal labor market	Low	High
	Difficulty in integrating in underground LM	Low	Low

FIGURE 4: COSTS AND RISKS OF AUTHORIZED STAY, OVERSTAY AND UNAUTHORIZED STAY

Costs and risks		Legal stay (auth entry + auth stay)	Overstay (auth entry + unauth stay)	Unauthorized stay (unauth entry + unauth stay)
		Legal family reunification, student visa, work visa	Tourist visa	
Actual Trip	Financial costs	High	High	Low
	Risk to physical safety	None	None	High
	Risk of apprehension	None	None	High
	Risk of failed attempt	Nil	Nil	High
Life at destination	Difficulty in finding housing	Low	Medium	Medium
	Difficulty integrating in legal labor market	Low	High	High

	AUTH. ENTRY	UNAUTHORIZED ENTRY
<b>TIE STRENGTH</b>		
STRONG TIES	+	0/-
WEAK TIES	+	+
<b>LOCATION OF NETWORK</b>		
CURRENT MIGRANT NETWORK	+	+
RETURN MIGRANT NETWORK	+	0/-
<b>RESOURCES OF NETWORK</b>		
AMOUNT	+	0/-
DIVERSITY	0/-	+

<b>Table 2: Multinomial Logistic Regression of Risk of taking a first trip to Europe, Legal status at migration</b>				
	Legal		Unauthorized	
	B	SE	B	SE
<b>Origin household</b>				
Urban origin	-	-	1.951†	(0.699)
Firstborn	1.37†	(0.22)	-	-
Number of Siblings	0.935***	(0.018)	-	-
Father unknown or deceased	0.489†	(0.192)	-	-
<i>Father's Education</i> (ref: No formal schooling)				
Primary school	1.71***	(0.33)	-	-
Secondary and above	-	-	-	-
<i>Religious affiliation ref: (Tidiane)</i>				
Khadre	-	-	-	-
<i>Muslim</i>				
Layène	-	-	-	-
Mouride	-	-	3.49**	(1.27)
Other Muslim	-	-	-	-
Catholic	0.53†	(0.18)	-	-
<i>Christian</i>				
Other Christian	-	-	-	-
<b>Current Household Structure</b>				
Married	-	-	-	-
Polygamous	-	-	-	-
Number of Children	0.834**	(0.041)	-	-
<b>Individual Characteristics/Status</b>				
Age	0.531**	(0.057)	0.605**	(0.105)
ln(age)	3.19 e7**	(9.30e7)	1.214 e5*	(5.75 e5)
<i>Education</i> (ref: primary school)				
No formal schooling	-	-	-	-
Lower secondary	-	-	-	-
Baccalaureate & above	1.484†	(0.334)	-	-
<i>Current Occupational Status</i> (ref: working)				
Studying	-	-	-	-
Unemployed	-	-	2.42**	(0.68)
At Home	4.70*	(3.57)	2.94**	(1.157)
Other Inactive	-	-	-	-
<i>Property</i>				
Land	-	-	-	-
House	0.53*	(0.176)	2.54**	(0.85)
Business	-	-	-	-
<b>Macro Factors</b>				
Period effects (ref: before 1984)				
1985-1993	-	-	-	-
1994-1998	-	-	-	-
1999-2003	-	-	5.39†	(5.51)
Since 2004	-	-	7.97*	(8.01)
Macro-Economic factors				
Urban population growth (%)	-	-	-	-
GDP per capita growth (%)	-	-	-	-
<b>Migrant Networks &amp; Alternative Hypothesis</b>				
Household migrant network	1.64***	(0.30)	1.21	(0.40)
Non-household migrant network	2.68***	(0.42)	1.98*	(0.55)
<i>N (person years)</i>	12955		12955	

Results presented in relative risk.

Note: † p&lt;0.10; \*p&lt;0.05; \*\*p&lt;0.01, \*\*\*p&gt;0.01. Individual weights included.

Source: MAFE-Senegal 2008.

<b>Table 3: Multinomial Logistic Estimation of Risk of taking a first trip to Europe, by legal status at migration: Tie Strength of migrant networks</b>		
	Legal entry	Unauthorized entry
Non-household migrant network		
Strong Tie	0.84 (0.19)	0.32* (0.16)
Weak Tie	2.53*** (0.40)	1.85* (0.54)
<i>Household migrant network</i>		
	1.63** (0.30)	1.41 (0.46)
<i>N</i> (person years)	12955	
Results are presented in relative risk. Controls include age, <i>ln</i> (age), marital status, polygamous, number of children, occupational status, land ownership, home ownership, business ownership, urban origin <sup>^</sup> , religious affiliation <sup>^</sup> , father's education <sup>^</sup> , father unknown/deceased at age 15 <sup>^</sup> , firstborn <sup>^</sup> , number of siblings <sup>^</sup> , own highest level of education <sup>^</sup> , period effects, % urban population growth and % GDP per capita growth. Except for indicators marked with <sup>^</sup> , all other indicators are time-varying, year-by-year. † <i>p</i> <0.10; * <i>p</i> <0.05; ** <i>p</i> <0.01, *** <i>p</i> <0.001		
Source: MAFE-Senegal 2008.		

<b>Table 3b: Multinomial Logistic Estimation of Risk of taking a first trip to Europe, by legal status at migration: Tie Strength of migrant networks</b>		
	Legal entry	Unauthorized entry
Non-household migrant network		
Strong Tie	0.91 (0.20)	0.34* (0.17)
Weak Tie		
Stronger weak tie	1.47 (0.39)	0.63 (0.39)
Middle weak	1.21 (0.32)	0.99 (0.61)
Weaker weak	3.82*** (0.70)	3.09** (0.61)
<i>Household migrant network</i>		
	1.81** (0.34)	1.39 (0.46)
<i>N</i> (person years)	12955	
Results are presented in relative risk. Controls include age, <i>ln</i> (age), marital status, polygamous, number of children, occupational status, land ownership, home ownership, business ownership, urban origin <sup>^</sup> , religious affiliation <sup>^</sup> , father's education <sup>^</sup> , father unknown/deceased at age 15 <sup>^</sup> , firstborn <sup>^</sup> , number of siblings <sup>^</sup> , own highest level of education <sup>^</sup> , period effects, % urban population growth and % GDP per capita growth. Except for indicators marked with <sup>^</sup> , all other indicators are time-varying, year-by-year. † <i>p</i> <0.10; * <i>p</i> <0.05; ** <i>p</i> <0.01, *** <i>p</i> <0.001		
Source: MAFE-Senegal 2008.		

<b>Table 4: Multinomial Logistic Estimation of the Risk of taking a first trip to Europe, by legal status at migration: Current and Return migrant networks</b>		
	Legal entry	Unauthorized entry
Having Current migrant network	3.16*** (0.54)	2.58** (0.79)
Having Return migrant network	0.75 (0.24)	-
<i>N</i> (person years)	12955	
Results are presented in relative risk. Controls include age, <i>ln</i> (age), marital status, polygamous, number of children, occupational status, land ownership, home ownership, business ownership, urban origin <sup>^</sup> , religious affiliation <sup>^</sup> , father's education <sup>^</sup> , father unknown/deceased at age 15 <sup>^</sup> , firstborn <sup>^</sup> , number of siblings <sup>^</sup> , own highest level of education <sup>^</sup> , period effects, % urban population growth and % GDP per capita growth. Except for indicators marked with <sup>^</sup> , all other indicators are time-varying, year-by-year. * <i>p</i> <0.05; ** <i>p</i> <0.01, *** <i>p</i> <0.001		
Source: MAFE-Senegal 2008.		

<b>Table 4a: Multinomial Logistic Estimation of the Risk of taking a first trip to Europe, by legal status at migration: Current and Return migrant networks</b>		
	Legal entry	Unauthorized entry
Current migrant network (size)	1.22*** (0.05)	1.14 (0.10)
Return migrant network (size)	0.87 (0.20)	-
<i>N</i> (person years)	12955	
Results are presented in relative risk. Controls include age, <i>ln</i> (age), marital status, polygamous, number of children, occupational status, land ownership, home ownership, business ownership, urban origin <sup>^</sup> , religious affiliation <sup>^</sup> , father's education <sup>^</sup> , father unknown/deceased at age 15 <sup>^</sup> , firstborn <sup>^</sup> , number of siblings <sup>^</sup> , own highest level of education <sup>^</sup> , period effects, % urban population growth and % GDP per capita growth. Except for indicators marked with <sup>^</sup> , all other indicators are time-varying, year-by-year. * <i>p</i> <0.05; ** <i>p</i> <0.01, *** <i>p</i> <0.001 Source: MAFE-Senegal 2008.		

<b>Table 5: Multinomial Logistic Estimation of the Odds of taking a first trip to Europe, by legal status at migration: Resources in Migrant Network (Amount and Diversity)</b>		
	Legal entry	Unauthorized entry
Amount of migration experience		
Non-household migrant network	1.00 (0.00)	0.99 (0.67)
Household migrant network	1.00 (0.01)	0.99 (0.60)
Diversity of migration experience		
Non-household migrant network	1.09† (0.06)	0.91 (0.13)
Household migrant network	1.00 (0.08)	1.01 (0.18)
<i>N</i> (person years)	12955	
Results are presented in relative risk. Controls include age, <i>ln</i> (age), urban origin <sup>^</sup> , religious affiliation <sup>^</sup> , father's education <sup>^</sup> , father unknown/deceased at age 15 <sup>^</sup> , firstborn <sup>^</sup> , number of siblings <sup>^</sup> , own highest level of education <sup>^</sup> , marital status, polygamous, number of children, occupational status, land ownership, home ownership, business ownership, period effects, % urban population growth and % GDP per capita growth. Except for indicators marked with <sup>^</sup> , all other indicators are time-varying, year-by-year. † <i>p</i> <0.10; * <i>p</i> <0.05; ** <i>p</i> <0.01; *** <i>p</i> <0.001 Source: MAFE-Senegal 2008.		

<b>Table 6: Multinomial Logistic Estimation of Risk of taking a first trip to Europe, by legal status of initial stay: Household / Non-household migrant networks</b>			
	Authorized stay	Overstay	Unauthorized Stay
Non-household migrant network	1.62* (0.36)	1.90† (0.68)	1.08 (0.43)
Household migrant network	2.36*** (0.43)	3.18** (1.10)	1.88† (0.61)
<i>N</i> (person years)	12955		
Results are presented in relative risk. Controls include age, <i>ln</i> (age), marital status, polygamous, number of children, occupational status, land ownership, home ownership, business ownership, urban origin <sup>^</sup> , religious affiliation <sup>^</sup> , father's education <sup>^</sup> , father unknown/deceased at age 15 <sup>^</sup> , firstborn <sup>^</sup> , number of siblings <sup>^</sup> , own highest level of education <sup>^</sup> , period effects, % urban population growth and % GDP per capita growth. Except for indicators marked with <sup>^</sup> , all other indicators are time-varying, year-by-year. † <i>p</i> <0.10; * <i>p</i> <0.05; ** <i>p</i> <0.01, *** <i>p</i> <0.001 Source: MAFE-Senegal 2008.			



<b>Table 6a: Multinomial Logistic Estimation of Risk of taking a first trip to Europe, by legal status of initial stay: Strong and Weak Ties of migrant networks</b>			
	Authorized stay	Overstay	Unauthorized Stay
Non-household migrant network			
Strong Tie	0.86 (0.23)	0.71 (0.34)	0.20* (0.15)
Weak Tie	2.14*** (0.41)	3.40*** (1.10)	1.98* (0.68)
<i>Household migrant network</i>	1.61* (0.37)	1.96† (0.72)	1.31 (0.52)
<i>N</i> (person years)	12955		
Results are presented in relative risk. Controls include age, <i>ln</i> (age), marital status, polygamous, number of children, occupational status, land ownership, home ownership, business ownership, urban origin <sup>^</sup> , religious affiliation <sup>^</sup> , father's education <sup>^</sup> , father unknown/deceased at age 15 <sup>^</sup> , firstborn <sup>^</sup> , number of siblings <sup>^</sup> , own highest level of education <sup>^</sup> , period effects, % urban population growth and % GDP per capita growth. Except for indicators marked with <sup>^</sup> , all other indicators are time-varying, year-by-year. † <i>p</i> <0.10; * <i>p</i> <0.05; ** <i>p</i> <0.01, *** <i>p</i> <0.001 Source: MAFE-Senegal 2008.			

<b>Table 6b: Multinomial Logistic Estimation of Risk of taking a first trip to Europe, by legal status of initial stay: Tie Strength of migrant networks</b>			
	Authorized stay	Overstay	Unauthorized Stay
Non-household migrant network			
Strong Tie	0.92 (0.24)	0.81 (0.39)	0.20* (0.15)
Weak Tie			
Stronger weak tie	1.59 (0.50)	0.89 (0.58)	0.73 (0.56)
Middle weak	1.06 (0.35)	1.60 (0.83)	0.49 (0.51)
Weaker weak	3.19*** (0.73)	5.49*** (1.91)	2.94** (1.11)
<i>Household migrant network</i>	1.77* (0.40)	2.18* (0.82)	1.28 (0.51)
<i>N</i> (person years)	12955		
Results are presented in relative risk. Controls include age, <i>ln</i> (age), marital status, polygamous, number of children, occupational status, land ownership, home ownership, business ownership, urban origin <sup>^</sup> , religious affiliation <sup>^</sup> , father's education <sup>^</sup> , father unknown/deceased at age 15 <sup>^</sup> , firstborn <sup>^</sup> , number of siblings <sup>^</sup> , own highest level of education <sup>^</sup> , period effects, % urban population growth and % GDP per capita growth. Except for indicators marked with <sup>^</sup> , all other indicators are time-varying, year-by-year. † <i>p</i> <0.10; * <i>p</i> <0.05; ** <i>p</i> <0.01, *** <i>p</i> <0.001 Source: MAFE-Senegal 2008.			

<b>Table 7a: Multinomial Logistic Estimation of the Risk of taking a first trip to Europe, by legal status of initial stay:: Current and Return migrant networks</b>			
	Authorized stay	Overstay	Unauthorized Stay
Having Current migrant network	2.94*** (0.57)	3.54** (1.38)	2.02* (0.69)
Having Return migrant network	0.72 (0.29)	0.87 (0.54)	-
<i>N</i> (person years)	12955		
Results are presented in relative risk. Controls include age, <i>ln</i> (age), marital status, polygamous, number of children, occupational status, land ownership, home ownership, business ownership, urban origin <sup>^</sup> , religious affiliation <sup>^</sup> , father's education <sup>^</sup> , father unknown/deceased at age 15 <sup>^</sup> , firstborn <sup>^</sup> , number of siblings <sup>^</sup> , own highest level of education <sup>^</sup> , period effects, % urban population growth and % GDP per capita growth. Except for indicators marked with <sup>^</sup> , all other indicators are time-varying, year-by-year. * <i>p</i> <0.05; ** <i>p</i> <0.01, *** <i>p</i> <0.001 Source: MAFE-Senegal 2008.			

<b>Table 8: Multinomial Logistic Estimation of the Odds of taking a first trip to Europe, by legal status of initial stay: Resources in Migrant Network (Amount and Diversity)</b>			
	Authorized stay	Overstay	Unauthorized Stay
Amount of migration experience			
Non-household migrant network	1.00 (0.00)	1.00 (0.01)	1.00 (0.01)
<i>Household migrant network</i>	1.00 (0.01)	0.99 (0.02)	0.98 (0.04)
Diversity of migration experience			
Non-household migrant network	1.01 (0.08)	1.21* (0.11)	0.71 (0.18)
<i>Household migrant network</i>	0.95 (0.10)	1.00 (0.14)	1.27 (0.24)
<i>N</i> (person years)	12955		
Results are presented in relative risk. Controls include age, <i>ln</i> (age), urban origin <sup>^</sup> , religious affiliation <sup>^</sup> , father's education <sup>^</sup> , father unknown/deceased at age 15 <sup>^</sup> , firstborn <sup>^</sup> , number of siblings <sup>^</sup> , own highest level of education <sup>^</sup> , marital status, polygamous, number of children, occupational status, land ownership, home ownership, business ownership, period effects, % urban population growth and % GDP per capita growth. Except for indicators marked with <sup>^</sup> , all other indicators are time-varying, year-by-year. † <i>p</i> <0.10; * <i>p</i> <0.05; ** <i>p</i> <0.01; *** <i>p</i> <0.001			
Source: MAFE-Senegal 2008.			

## ANNEX (FAMILY MIGRATION POLICIES IN FRANCE, SPAIN &amp; ITALY)

## Family Migration Policies in France

Year	Law	Who's eligible	Proceedings	Requirements of primary migrant	Restrictions	Major Measure	Approach
Until 1974	Citizens of former colonies of France (including Senegal) were allowed to enter France with "identity card" only, and needed neither a residence nor work permit (Kofman <i>et al</i> 2010: 9).						
1993 /4	Law 93-1027 Decree 7 Nov. 1994	+ Spouse + Minor children, except those who are "threat to public order"		+ Has a permit for >1 yr or has a temporary permit (visitor, salaried, student) + Sufficient income (OMI) + Adequate housing certificate (municipality)	+ Only family living abroad is eligible + Residence permit depends on sponsor + Work permit upon arrival + Spouses must stay together >1 yr after arrival	Introduction of minimum time spouses must live together post reunification	De facto family reunification
1998	Law 98-349 1 May 1998	+ Spouse + Minor children		+ Minimum legal residence: 1 year			
2003	Law 2003-1119 26 Nov 2003	+ Spouse + Minor children	Once income and housing are documented by municipality, OMI (national immigration office) then verifies	+ Sufficient income (municipality) + Adequate housing certificate (municipality)	+ French language + Familiarity with republican principles + Spouses must stay together >2 yr after arrival, except in cases of violence	+ Introduction of language and civic requirements + Greater role for municipality	
2006	Law 2006-911 24 July 2006	+ Spouse + Minor children		+ Minimum legal residence: 1.5 years + Adequate resources (>= SMIC without social allowances) + Housing comparable to native French families in region	+ Spouses must stay together >3 yr after arrival, except for cases of violence or if child is born in France and provides child support	+ Raise resource and housing requirements	
2007	Law 2007-1631 20 Nov 2007	+ Spouse + Minor children		+ Adequate resources depends on family size (1000-1200€ net/month) + Parental contract (children's behavior)	+ Long-term visa applicants will need to show adequate level in French – two chances to pass exam	+ Continue to raise resource req. + Introduction of parental contract	

Source: Adapted from Kofman *et al* 2010: 26-29

**Family Migration Policies in Spain**

Year	Law	Who's eligible	Proceedings	Requirements of primary migrant	Restrictions	Major Measure	Approach
1985	Ley de Extranjeria					No mention of LFR	NO legal right to legal family reunification – treated according to “administration discretion” (Araujo 2010: 22-23)
1986	1st Regulation for the execution of the Law (RD 1119/86)	+ Spouse + Children under 18, and dependent children over 18 + Ascendents			+ NO specification of limits of degree of relation + NO minimum time of residency	1st mention of LFR	
1994	Resolution of February 1994	+ Spouse + Children under 18, and dependent children over 18 + Ascendents	Two paths for LFR visa + visa request in country of origin + Exemption of visa req. for family residing irregularly in Spain	+ “Stable and sufficient economic means” to care for family (last 3 monthly pay slips), including health care if not covered by Social Security + Proof of sufficient housing		+ Differentiates between non-EU and EU nationals	
1996	Regulation of 1996	+ Spouse + Sons and daughters < 18 yrs + Ascendents		All the above	+ Dependent descendants above legal age, grandchildren and great-grandchildren	+ Explicitly restricts dependent category to sons and daughters	
2000	<i>Ley de Extranjeria</i> 4/2000			All the above + For spousal LFR, a signed statement that no other spouse is residing in Spain	+ Sons and daughters must be under 18 at time of application		
2000	Organic Law 8/2000			All the above	+ Reunified spouse must live for >=2 yrs with sponsor	+ Limits list of acceptable 3 <sup>o</sup> migrants + Introduces possibility of chain migration (former 2 <sup>o</sup> can be 1 <sup>o</sup> sponsor)	
2001	Regulation of 2001			All the above + Independent (non-LFR) residence permit		+ Limits chain migration	
2003	Law in 2003			All the above + Work permit	+ LFR visas only help to enter country. Upon entry, must apply for permit	+ Avoids fraud in chain migration	
2005				All the above + Work contract + Registration in Social Security or private health insurance			

Source: Own elaboration from information found in Gil Araujo 2010.

**Family Migration Policies in Italy**

Year	Law	Who's eligible	Proceedings	Requirements of primary migrant	Restrictions	Major Measure	Approach
1986	Law 943/1986 (1 <sup>st</sup> immigration law)	+ Spouse + Unmarried dependent minor children + Dependent parents		+ legal status + work as employee + ability to ensure 'normal life conditions'	+ Reunified family not allowed to work for one year		Emergency measure
1988	<i>Circolare</i>	All the above		+ income + housing		+ Allows for regularization of family already in Italy	
1990	<i>Circolare</i>	All the above		All the above		+ Revoke 1988 <i>Circolare</i>	
1990	Martelli Law 39/1990	All the above		All the above		+ Introduces norms of rights & responsibilities of LFR	Long-term perspective
1992	<i>Circolari</i> 29030/C of Ministry of Foreign Affairs & 69/92 of Ministry of Interior	All the above	+ Simplified bureaucratic process + Reduced processing time	Specify "Normal life conditions" + job contract + rent contract + in some cases, proof of utility payment/s		+ Specifies requirements and simplifies process	Administration attempts to fill-in gaps of legislation
1995	<i>Decreto Dini</i> (Decree Law 489/1995)	All the above		+ Minimum legal residence: 1 yr + Holds >= 2-year work permit + "Suitable Housing" Declaration from municipality + Income can be from multiple household member			
1998	<i>Turco-Napolitano Law/ Testo Unico</i> (Law 40/1998)	All the above + Unmarried disabled adult children + Minor children from previous marriages + Foster children + Disabled relatives up to 3 <sup>rd</sup> °		+ Self- employed & employees are eligible + study, religious permit holders	+ All LFR migrants are allowed to work upon arrival	+ LFR exempt from set quotas	LFR rights for all who living legally in Italy long-term, not just workers
1998	<i>Circolare</i> (66/1998) Ministry of Interior				+ Dependent parents allowed to work		
2001	Court ruling			+ family permit holders			
2002	<i>Bossi-Fini</i> Law (189/2002) and Decree Law 195/2002	+ Parents of all ages, with no children at origin + Parents older than 65, whose offspring at origin cannot work + Only <u>fully</u> disabled adult					Reforms 1998 Law

		children					
2007	Decree Law 5	+ All minor children + All parents in need (lack adequate resources at origin)	+ Bureaucracy simplified: family relationship doc. shown at consulate, not provincial police + Limits processing time to 90 days	+ Loosen housing requirement (qualification by local health authorities, not municipality) <sup>14</sup>		+ Removes requirement of proof of minor child's dependency + In cases of expulsion/ permit renewals, must now consider legally residing family in Italy	Loosens requirements
2008	New public security law. 125/2008	+ Adult spouse (not separated) + Minor children + (fully) dependent adult children + Parents from 2002 (without offspring at origin, or whose offspring cannot work)					Tightens requirements

Source: Own elaboration from information found in Bonizzoni and Cibeà (2009).

<sup>14</sup> In case of reunifying children younger than 14, parents need only an acceptance letter from homeowner.